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A Comparative Analysis of Spain's
Startup Co-Investment Fund and the
United States Government Funded
Venture Capital
BY KELLY GUNDERSON*

I. Introduction
The entrepreneurial character of United States has not only
created new job opportunities and sponsored the economy, but also
formed a society where citizens may take pride in owning their own
businesses and creating ideas that change the world.1 Larry Page and
Sergey Brin are a classic example of American entrepreneurial spirit,
transforming their garage filled with computers into the worldrenowned search engine, Google. 2 Innovation through new venture
start-ups has been shown to have a direct effect on the growth of a
3
country's overall economy.
Nations seeking to improve their economy, therefore, are
naturally looking to foster innovation and start-ups within their
country. Among the most common barriers to such growth are lack
of capital to finance new ideas and the lack of experience typical of

* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of California Hastings College of the Law; B.A.
University of California, Davis 2010. I would like to thank Professor Abraham Cable
for his immeasurable guidance in writing this note. I would also like to thank my
parents, Jane and Gary, for your endless support of my education and career.
1. Legal scholars have given great attention to the "funding gap" issue in
venture capital financing. E.g. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineeringa Venture CapitalMarket:
Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003).
2. E.g. Our History in Depth, GOOGLE (Feb. 1, 2014, 12:43 PM), http://www.
google.com/about/company/history/.
3. E.g. JOSH LERNER, BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS 43 (2009).
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those with innovative ideas. 4 In order to overcome these hurdles,
young start-ups look to venture capital ("VC") to provide the
necessary funding and guidance, including "business contacts,
strategic advice and other managerial support." 5 Furthermore, the
use of VC has been shown to shorten the time for young start-ups to
have an initial public offering ("IPO"), which has a variety of benefits
that will be discussed at greater length in this paper. 6
VC, however, does not come without risk to the investors. Given
the early stage in which investors are financing the company, there is
an increased risk the start-up will not perform as projected. 7 Another
concern for VC investors is the uniquely unilateral hold of
information by the innovators and entrepreneurs seeking funding. 8
While the VC investor may have minimal to no knowledge regarding
the product for which funding is sought, the entrepreneur has
uniquely in-depth knowledge that leaves the investor at a
disadvantage. 9 This "information asymmetry" problem is amplified
by the complicated nature of many start-ups. Whether it is a
biotechnology start-up using complex DNA sequencing, or a
computer technology start-up involving a large amount of coding,
investors will often lack the requisite knowledge to fully understand
the product. 10
Finally, Professor Ronald Gilson notes the issue of potentially high
agency costs." These costs include the danger of an entrepreneur's
goals of self-enrichment and investors often not reaping the benefits of

4. Christian Keuschnigg, Optimal Public Policy for Venture Capital Backed
Innovation 1 (Risk Capital and the Financing of European Innovative Firms, Working
Paper No. 004, 2003).
5. Id.
6. Thomas Hellmann & Manju Puri, The Interaction Between Product Market and
FinancingStrategy: The Role of Venture Capital,13 THE REV. OF FIN. STUD. 959,959-984 (2000).
7. Gilson, supra note 1, at 1076. Ronald Gilson explains the major problems the
U.S. VC has faced in forming its VC industry that are mostly unique to this kind of
large early stage investment. He then explains the measures taken by VCs in order
to protect their investments.
8. Id. at 1077.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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their investments for a long time, if at all. 1 2 All of these concerns facing

VC financers explain why a country that desires to increase its nation's
economy via innovative start-ups must be cautious to build an
infrastructure that eases the potential risks for investors.
This paper will analyze Spain's new government funded venture
capital program, the Startup Co-Investment Fund ("SCIF"), in order
to determine its likelihood of success in Spain and whether other
countries should also look to a similar program in order to build their
VC market. To effectively examine the new program it will be helpful
to carefully explore the U.S.'s venture capital market and history, as
the U.S. ranked number one for VC in 2013, while Spain remained at
number twenty-seven.' 3 This paper will particularly focus on the
U.S.'s most successful region, Silicon Valley.' 4 Spain currently faces
a need for reform of its VC market, as it is losing some of its greatest
minds and entrepreneurs to countries that are more favorable for
start-ups, like the U.S. 15 This drain of some of Spain's foremost

16
innovators is undoubtedly having a negative effect on the economy.
"Access to capital in Spain has been shown to be one of the most
significant challenges that entrepreneurs face for starting and
growing a technology business."' 7 Laura Bottazzi's and Marco Da
Rin's article explained, "a vibrant venture capital industry is the
cornerstone of America's leadership in the commercialization of
technological innovation, and the lack of venture capital hinders
European firms from competing on equal footing."18

12. Id.
13. Alexander Groh, et. al., The Global Venture Capital and Private Equity Country
Attractiveness Index, IESE Bus. School Univ. of Navarra (2013) http://blog.
iese.edu/vcpeindex/spain/.
14. PricewaterhouseCoopers National Venture Capital Association, Regional
Aggregate Data (Jan. 12, 2014), available at https://www.pwcmoneytree.com.
15. Manuel Baigorri, Spain's Startups Leave in Search of Venture Capital,BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 21, 2013, 3:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-21/spanishpreference-for-property-over-startups-deepens-woe-tech.html.
16. Alan Clendenning, Class of 2012: Young, Spaniardsbuck crisis with risky startups,
braking with tradition, CANADIAN PRESS (Mar. 10, 2013).
17. Itxaso del-Palacio et al., The Capital Gap for Small Technology Companies: Public
Venture Capital to the Rescue? 38 SMALL Bus. ECON. 283, 284 (2012).
18. Laura Bottazzi and Marco Da Rin, Venture Capital in Europe and the Financing
of Innovative Companies, 17 ECON. POL'Y 229, 231 (2002); See generally, European
Commission, Green Paperon Innovation, 688 (Dec. 1995).
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The IE Business School of Madrid and the Empresa Nacional de
Innovaci6n ("ENISA"), a government organization created to
stimulate growth among small to medium size companies, came
together to create the SCIF.19 The SCIF was enacted on September 12,
2012 and matches equity investments by accredited investors for
loans of up to 1.5 million euros. 20 Government sponsored VC can
assist in the important act of creating an infrastructure that enables
innovation and start-ups to thrive. 21 This infrastructure includes
trained lawyers and accountants who, with prior training, will be able
to provide more cost effective assistance to start-ups. 22 In what Josh
Learner refers to as a "virtuous cycle," these "pioneering
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists pave the way for subsequent
generations: in a given city." 23 Also, government funded VC can play
the important role of giving a government certification that the VC
market is credible, providing a viable option for investors and
entrepreneurs.24
In determining the effectiveness of the SCIF and the likelihood
of success in stimulating the Spanish VC market I will look at the
U.S.'s VC history and the pillars that have created the thriving
industry in places like Silicon Valley. Then, it will be beneficial to
take a closer look at U.S. government-initiated VC programs. I will
then analyze Spain's VC history and likely future. Finally, I will
apply and compare the pillars that have led to a successful VC
market in the U.S. to those implemented in Spain by way of the SCIF
and government reforms Spain has taken to aid its VC market.
0

19. Empresa Nacional de Innovaci6n SA, Spain Startup Co-Investment Fund,
http://www.enisa.es/en/innovation/info/enisa-programmes/spain-startup-co-in
vestment-fund (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
20. Id. The investments by SCIF comes in the form of loans that must be repaid.
21. LERNER, supra note 3, at 66.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 69.
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II. The United Stated Venture Capital System
A. Silicon Valley's Venture CapitalHistory
The U.S. venture capital market is the product of both organic
process and government intervention. While a more complete
history of the U.S.'s VC industry can be found in Section III below,
this section focuses on the narrower sphere of Silicon Valley's history
and foundation.
Starting during the Gold Rush, California's bar on covenants not
to compete set the stages for the Californians' unique ability to break
away from large companies and begin start-ups directly competing
with former employers. 25 Furthermore, if not for the creation of
Stanford University and its industrial park, it is questionable whether
the start-up hub of Silicon Valley would have ever become the success
26
it is today.
In a study analyzing the importance of a biotech firms' location
in relation to their IPO and capital funding, it was found that when
biotech companies moved to the San Francisco area they were able to
earn on average an additional $6.3 million in capital. 27 The study
found that this was attributable to the Bay Area's research
universities, information flow from other entrepreneurs, and the
large labor pool. 28
The question of how Silicon Valley became the VC and start-up
giant it is today, however, may find its answer in a more simple
explanation. "Some accounts leave the impression that the right and
charismatic and talented people simply collaborated at the right
time." 29 This more fortuitous view of Silicon Valley's foundation
suggests that good timing and California's sunny weather may be the

25. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 1069.
26. Id. The effect government intervention had on U.S. VC will be explained in
Section II.
27. David L. Deeds et al., The Impact of Firm-specific Capabilitieson the Amount of
CapitalRaised in an Initial Public Offering: Evidencefrom the Biotechnology Industry, 12 J.
OF Bus. VENTURING 31 (1997).
28. Id.
29. Abraham J. B. Cable, Startup Lawyers at the Outskirts, 50 WILLAMErrE L. REV. 163,
182 (2014); see also Abraham J. B. Cable, Incubator Cities: Tomorrow's Economy, Yesterday's
Start-Ups,2 MIcH. J.OF PRIVATE EQurrY & VENTURE CAPITAL 195, note 145 (2013).
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best explanation for the world-renowned cluster. 30 While these
chance events may have some effect on what created Silicon Valley,
it seems unlikely to be the sole explanation for this major VC hub.
B. The Pillars of the United States' Venture Capital
The U.S. VC system relies on several pillars to create its success.
In order to assess Spain's future for success in VC it will be important
to consider these pillars in establishing what has lead to an effective
U.S. system and apply these pillars to those implemented in Spain by
way of the SCIF.
1. Pillar1: The U.S. Legal Infrastructure
Fundamental to the Silicon Valley VC market is California's
unique refusal to enforce non-compete agreements. 31 This is essential
in the industry of start-ups, where employees of companies may wish
to leave their current employer and begin their own business or join
an emerging start-up. In so doing, they will often stay in an industry
similar to that of their last employment and rely at least partially on
the knowledge gained from previous employers.32 This common
scenario played out after technology giant, Hewlett-Packard, lost its
former CEO, Mark Hurd, to Oracle.33 In an article talking about the
suit, it was noted that California "specifically does not want
companies turning confidentiality agreements into after the fact noncompete agreements." 34
Also, part of the legal structuring of the VC industry in the U.S.
is the legal entity of limited partnerships. By making the VC fund a
limited partnership, the investors may enjoy the benefits of limited
liability and tax flow through. 35 Limited liability protects investors
from potential suits or debts against the company, limiting the
amount they will owe to no greater than the amount of their

30. Cable, Startup Lawyers at the Outskirts, supra note 29, at 179-80.
31. Jeremy Hitchcock, Noncompete Claws: An Antiquated Restriction is Hurting Tech
Growth in Massachusetts, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 2013.
32. Id.
33. Erica Ogg, HP Suing Former CEO Mark Hurd, CNET (Sept. 7, 2010, 2:44 PM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/hp-suing-former-ceo-mark-hurd/.
34. Id.
35. See Learner, supra note 3, at 101-102.
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investment. Taxes in limited partnerships flow through, meaning
there is only a single taxation on the individual partners of the VC.36
The U.S. legal infrastructure also ensures that exit by way of an
initial public offering will be possible. The ease of exit helps investors
guarantee that, if the start-up is successful, they receive a high return
for their risky investment. Exit also serves another purpose, as VC
funds help entrepreneurs by providing important guidance and
expertise as the start-up goes through its early stage and then
37
allowing control to return to the entrepreneur after the IPO. IPOs
also recycle VC talent, allowing investors to find new ventures to
pursue after exiting. 38 A study focusing on IPOs in the biotechnology
industry found that "entrepreneurs need to be very selective when
choosing their lead venture capital firms, lead underwriters, and
39
CEOs," as this can have a large impact on the success of an IPO.
U.S bankruptcy law plays an important role in the American
entrepreneur's willingness to take risks. While in many other
countries bankruptcy is socially unacceptable and feared, bankruptcy
lacks this level of stigma in the U.S.40 Outside the social repercussions
associated with bankruptcy proceedings, there is also a very real risk
for entrepreneurs who often use their own funds to provide the initial
capital.41 The U.S. bankruptcy law regime uniquely frees debtors
from creditors seeking repayment after filing for bankruptcy. As the
U.S. Supreme Court stated, the system gives the debtor a "new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by
the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt." 42 Without a
"fresh start" program like the U.S. has, there is a very high risk for
entrepreneurs that will prevent many from creating a start-up.
36. Id.
37. Cable, Incubator Cities: Tomorrow's Economy, Yesterday's Start-Ups, supra note
29, at 229.
38. Id.

39. Todd Finkle, The Relationship Between Boards of Directors and Initial Public
Offerings in the Biotechnology Industry, ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY & PRAC. (Mar. 22,

1998), at 22.
40. Adrian Wooldridge, Global Heroes: A Special Report on Entrepreneurship,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 2009, at 6.

41. John Armour & Douglas Cunmming, The Legal Road to Replicating Silicon Valley
3 (ESRC Centre for Business Research, Working Paper No. 281, 2004).
42. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
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Finally, U.S. immigration policies, with a history of supporting
openness to entrepreneurs, have played an important role in
attracting bright minds from abroad. 43 Immigrants or their children
founded approximately 40% of Fortune 500 companies in the U.S.44
However, the U.S.'s open immigration policies have come to a slow,
as the government is tightening immigration restrictions. This
change in immigration policies has reportedly led Mark Zuckerberg
(the founder and CEO of Facebook) and other entrepreneurs in
Silicon Valley to begin planning a lobby for more open immigration
policies. 45 While current U.S. immigration regulations are not
providing the same openness that helped start-up ventures
previously, the country's past open immigration policies were an
important factor in creating successful companies.
In sum, the U.S. legal infrastructure laid the groundwork for the
successful U.S. VC market, allowing a greater flow of ideas and
brining in persons from abroad to add to the innovation pool. The
U.S. legal framework also crucially incentivizes investors to fund new
ventures by minimizing their risks and maximizing potential returns.
2. PillarII: Incentivizing and Evaluatingfor GreaterPerformance
In the U.S., an angel investor or a group of venture capitalists
(Limited Partners) will often provide the funding, and then look to a
General Partner ("GP") to actually control the VC's investments. 46 It is
therefore critical that this GP has a desire for the new venture to
succeed. The GP generally has a 20% carried interest in the venture
that is completely dependent on its success, incentivizing the GP to
help the new venture grow and thrive. 47 Potentially even more

43. See Wooldridge, supra note 40, at 7.
44. Stuart Anderson, 40 Percentof Fortune500 Companies Foundedby Immigrants or
their Children, FORBES, (June 19,2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson
/2011/06/19/40-percent-of-fortune-500-companies-founded-by-immigrants-or-thei
r-children/.
45. Immigration and America's High-industry: The Jobs Machine, THE ECONOMIST,
(Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21576101-start-upsfounded-immigrants-are-creating-jobs-all-over-america-jobs-machine.
46. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 1071.
47. Todd Hixon, An Insider Perspective on CarriedInterest, FORBES, (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/toddhixon/2012/02/02/an-insider-perspective-oncarried-interest/.
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incentivizing is the effect of past performance on the GP's reputation
in the VC community.48 Upon the end of a GP's control of a fund,
usually terminated after ten years when liquidation becomes
mandatory, the GP will then seek to manage a new fund. 49 This
provides a strong incentive to perform well, so the GP's reputation
among the VC community remains positive. It is this reputation that
will safeguard the GP's career, and in turn protect the Limited Partners.
The U.S. system also focuses on the importance of structuring the
legal relationship in order to decrease the risk for investors. 50 It does
this by providing investors "more control than equity" in their
investments. 51 VC investors may use staged financing as one method
of control, whereby the start-up must meet certain requirements and
goals emplaced by the VC before they will provide the next round of
funding. 52 These check-ins allow the VC investors to protect their
investment by verifying that progress is being made according to
their specifications prior to providing additional funding. A second
form of control can be contracted into the VC agreement with the
start-up; here, the VC investors are given partial or complete control
of the emerging company's board of directors.5 3 This allows the VC
investors to protect their investments and have greater regulation
over the direction of the emerging company.
A final factor assisting in assurance for greater performance is
evaluation of the entrepreneur's track record prior to investing.5 4 It
is crucial that the investor know as much about the entrepreneur's
vision and past performance as possible to ensure the greatest
likelihood for success.

48. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 1071.

49. Id.; See also Committee on Small Business House of Representatives, 109th Cong.
(2007) (Statement of Mr. Redding regarding the importance of SBIC funding for
ventures that cannot receive VC, but go on to succeed with SBIC funding. The report
also discusses the problems facing the SBICs.)
50. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 1088
51. Id. at 1082.

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Learner, supra note 3, at 142.
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3. PillarIII: The United States Culture and Perspective
The entrepreneurial culture of the U.S. plays an important part
in supporting those who are willing to take the risk to create a startup. The U.S. has long been considered a society of dreamers, who are
more open to innovation than recreation. "America plays a vital role
in spreading the culture of entrepreneurialism around the world.
People the world over admire its ability to produce world-changing
entrepreneurs, such as a Bill Gates, wealth-creating universities such
as Harvard and Stanford, and world-beating clusters, such as Silicon
Valley." 55 The U.S. also boasts consumers that are more willing to
take risks than most.56 With the wave of new technology and complex
programs, there must also be consumers who are willing to learn the
skills necessary to use the new gadgets and products that start-ups
are building.
4. PillarIV: The United States Higher Education System
The U.S. higher education system plays a strong role in
cultivating young entrepreneurs. Stanford University in particular
has a close tie to the start-up society in Silicon Valley.5 7 In fact, about
half of all start-ups in Silicon Valley trace their beginnings to Stanford
58
University.
III. The United States Government Funded
Venture Capital Programs
A. History
The catalyst for U.S. VC was the end of the Great Depression and
a widespread fear of yet another economic downturn after the war's
end. 59 In 1956, American Research Development ("ARD") became the
first government-funded program created to finance new ventures.
ARD, however, ultimately failed due to the tensions between its goals
of public benefit and profitability. 60
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See Wooldridge, supra note 40, at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See LERNER, supra note 3, at 39.
Id. at 38.
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Twelve years later, the government again looked to government
funded VC to help the market, this time creating a program that
enabled the Small Business Administration (SBA) to invest in Small
Business Investment Companies (SBICs). This effort at publicly
funded VC was much more successful, investing in companies such
as Apple, Intel and Compaq when they were still young start-ups.
Arguably its greatest contribution to the U.S. VC market was the
creation of an infrastructure in Silicon Valley, which private investors
61
were later able to use to ease the costs associated with new ventures
While the SBICs played an important role in VC, they are now
arguably unnecessary, as the SBA program failed to adapt and
sufficiently change with the industry.62 In 1995, SBICs owed the SBA
$501 million, $252 million of which the SBA predicted it would not
get back due to failure of the new ventures. 63 Another commonly
cited criticism is the over-regulation of the program. SBICs, however,
remain an active government program and are sometimes credited
with playing an important role at its inception in creating a basis for
future VC in Silicon Valley. 64
B. Criticisms of Government Venture Capital Programs
Government funded VC has not been without its critics. It is
important to consider the potential pitfalls of government VC in order
to analyze the capacity of the SCIF to avoid them. First among the
possible pitfalls is over-funding that may result in crowding,
effectively wasting funds and actually competing with private funds
to the point of their removal from the market. 65 A second common
criticism, one that can be seen in both the ARD and SBIC programs in
the U.S., is lack of flexibility. 66 It is crucial for VC funds to assess each
investment individually, and set requirements and goals for that

61. Id. at 38-39.
62. Byrne A. Bowman, SBICs: Pioneers in Organized Venture Capital, 26 THE Bus.
LAW. 1793, 1793 (1970-1971).

63. See Mehta, SBA's Program Will Show Millions of Dollars in Losses, GAO Says,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1995, at B2.

64. See LERNER, supra note 3, at 10. See also LINDA WEISS, AMERICAN INC.?:
INNOVATION AND ENTERPRISE IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 57 (2014).
65. See Armour, supra note 41, at 3.
66. See Learner, supra note 3, at 125.
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particular company. It has also been noted that failure to meet
requirements set out for SBIC management has not been closely
policed, resulting in questionable business practices by management. 67
Thirdly is the criticism that government VC does not invest in
the best locations, as political sway pulls government funding to
where constituents are.68 Finally, a fundamental problem with design
of SBICs is the debt structure that requires repayment to the SBA on
a fixed schedule. 69 The nature of start-ups does not allow for regular
payment of a loan, as capital will often not be available because startups are in their initial growth stages. 70 Instead, start-ups provide
their returns to investors at exit, making SBIC funding impractical for
young start-ups without capital.
IV. Spain's Venture Capital System
A. History
Spain's first public efforts to create a VC market in the country
were between the years 1970 and 2000, but these investments largely
focused on traditional and more developed (not start-up) markets. 71
Spain was hit hard by the 2001 Dot-Corn Bubble burst as "the share
of total venture-capital investments made in high technology
ventures.., dropped from 26.2% in 2000 to 8.9% in 2001."72 This drop

resulted in investors shifting their few early-stage investments to
more traditional markets and avoiding the emerging technology
sector. 73 Starting around 2000, the government began to take a
greater interest in promoting early-stage investments for high-tech
firms, most notably through the creation of NEOTEC in 2000.74 The

government took a very hands-on role under the program, deciding

67. See Mehta, supra note 63.
68. Id. at 135.
69. Cable, Incubator Cities: Tomorrow's Economy, Yesterday's Start-Ups, supra note
29, at 205.
70. Id.
71. Del-Palacio, supra note 17, at 283.
72. Id. at 287.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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which companies to invest in and monitoring their progress.75
In an effort to pull itself out of a VC lull between 2004 and 2005
the Spanish government passed new tax codes and Ley 25/2005,
effectively lowering taxes for VC companies and investors and
alleviating legal restrictions on VC investors. 76 Finally, in 2005 the
government created ENISA to provide public funding for VC.
B. The Startup Co-Investment Fund
ENISA and the IE Business School set up a public-private
partnership whereby ENISA will match equity investments by
accredited investors with loans of up to 1.5 million euros. 77 The
program requires investors to meet an initial set of requirements. For
VC co-investment partners, they must: (1) have made at least three
investments in an unlisted company within the prior two years; (2)
work or have worked within the past two years "in a professional
capacity in the venture capital sector," or have advised or financed
small to medium companies, or have been a director of a company
with annual earnings of at least 1 million euros; and (3) have a fund
of 1 million euros or have liquid assets (accessible to invest) of 500,000
euros. 78 For angel investors, requirements one and two are the same,
the difference being requirement three: (3) the investor must be a
natural person (not a legal entity) with a net worth (or joint with
spouse) of at least 1 million euros or liquid assets (accessible to invest)
of at least 100,000 euros. 79
75. Id.
76. "Ley" means "law" in Spanish. Disposiciones Generales (B.O.E. 2005, 282)
(Spain); Norman A. Hernandez & Roberto Santilln, An Overview of Spain's Venture
Capital Industry, TECNOLOICO DE MONTERREY (Mar. 19, 2010).
77. Gobierno de Espana, Spain Startup Co-Investment Fund, http://www.
enisa.es/en/innovation/info/enisa-programmes/spain-startup-co-investment-fund.
78. Gobierno de Espana, SSCF Venture Capital Co-Investment PartnerApplication
Form, https://spainstartupcoinvestmentfund.es/Form.aspx?locale=enUS&type=l&cl=l.
79. Gobierno de Espana, SSCF Business Angel Co-Investment PartnerApplication
Form, https://spainstartupcoinvestmentfund.es/Forn.aspx?locale=en-US&type=2&cl=l.
An interesting aspect of the SCIF program is its creation to foster both angel investors
and VC. Angel investment funds are generally used for start-ups at the beginning of
their life cycle, while VC funding usually comes subsequent. Whether the same
program can successfully foster both remains a question. See also, Cable, Incubator
Cities: Tomorrow's Economy, Yesterday's Start-Ups, supranote 29, at 206-08.
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Once accredited, an investor submits loan applications to ENISA
on behalf of the companies in which they have invested. 80 The
program guarantees a response within 15 days for those seeking
funding less than 300,000 euros, and 45 days for those investments in
excess of 300,000 euros.81 ENISA has a cap of 1,500,000 euros of
investment per company. 82 After the loan is provided, the SCIF
requires annual accounts of the company's progress and notification
83
of major modifications in corporate structure or business plans.
There is no involvement by the SCIF or ENISA in the corporation's
board or shareholder meetings8 4
The loan provided requires no collateral, and the SCIF waives
principal payments for the first two to four years (the duration
depending on the company's projections for when they will break
even).8 However, payment on the principle must start at the
specified date, regardless of whether the company has met its
projections. 86 Interest rate payments start immediately, and vary in
amount depending on the profitability of the company. 87 Should
there be a default, the loans are subordinated, meaning they have low
seniority for repayment. 88
C. The Current Progress of the Startup Co-Investment Fund and the
VC Market in Spain
In its most recent report, Spain's SCIF had 113 accredited
investors, 24 of which were foreign investors from around the globe,
including the U.S., Denmark, France, and Russia.89 The SCIF program
places among its goals attracting funding from non-Spanish
80. E-mail from Cormac Leggett, Institutional Relations of ENISA, to author
(Apr. 2, 2014, 3:03 PDT) (on file with author).
81. Gobierno de Espana, Spain Startup Co-Investment Fund, http://www.

enisa.es/en/innovation/info/enisa-programmes/spain-startup-co-investment-fund.
82. Id.
83. E-mail from Cormac Leggett, supranote 80.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Gobierno de Espana, Spain Startup Co-Investment Fund Nota Informativa (on
file with author).
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investors. 90 For each euro funded by ENISA, private investors have
provided 2.8 euros.91 From October 2013 to October 2014, SCIF
investments equaled approximately 24 million euros, and accredited
investors contributed 44.6 million euros to fund a total of 141
operations. 92 These numbers are up approximately 10 million euros
from the October 2012 to October 2013 report.93
Spain's overall VC market leading up to the inception of the SCIF
was taking a downturn. In 2012, total VC investments equaled 158
million euros, decreasing 22.8% from 2011. 94 Of those funds, 77% of
the total invested were by private entities, while the remaining 23%
were by public entities. 9 With the Spanish economy suffering an
overall
depression, high unemployment,
and decreased
consumption, government assistance with early-stage funding
96
through organizations such as ENISA serves an important role.
In the most recent report reflecting Spain's VC market in 2013,
overall VC investments decreased by 7.5% from 2012. 97 The 2013 VC
market, however, took a noticeable upturn at the start of the summer,
suggesting 2014 will be a more successful year for VC in Spain
(market numbers are not out yet).98 80% of the total amount invested
in 2013 was realized in the second half of the year. 99 While the overall
decrease is not what supporters of SCIF would like to see postenactment of the program, the upturn in the last half of 2013 suggests
the numbers in 2014 may show an increase in VC investments.

90. Id. This goal is interesting, as angel investors traditionally invest in ventures
located near them regionally. FAQs on Angel Investing, ANGEL CAPITAL ASSOCIATION
(Mar. 28, 2013, 1:14 PM), http://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/entrepreneurs/
faqs/.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Associacion Espanola de Entidades de Capital Riesgo, Venture Capital &
Private Equity in Spain 2013, 1, 22.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 11, 24.
97. Associacion Espanola de Entidades de Capital Riesgo, Venture Capital &
Private Equity in Spain 2014, 1, 9, http://www.ascri.org/upload/publicaciones/
20140626_084042_1985245700.pdf.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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V. Comparison Between the United States VC System and
Spain's SCIF Program
A.

The SCIF Compared to The U.S. Government FundedARD

The U.S.'s first government funded VC, ARD, was ultimately
unsuccessful due to "bureaucratic constraints, lack of professional
expertise, and a faulty design of capital structure and incentives." 00
SCIF will have to be cautious of the common pitfall to government
programs, over-regulation and inflexibility due to the bureaucratic
nature of governments. In the investment terms, SCIF does place
time constraints, promising to inform potential investors quickly
whether they will qualify.' 01 This guarantee of speediness seems to
be an effort not to allow the bureaucratic nature of government to
effect timeliness. The level of oversight and regulation by the SCIF
over the start-ups is limited, only requiring annual accounts and
notification of major events. 102 This limited regulation seems to
account for much of the over-regulation problem that befell ARD.
Whether the program will be sufficiently flexible with changing
markets, however, remains to be seen.
Spain appears to have accounted for the concern of professional
expertise. The SCIF is not solely a government program; instead, it
created the program in conjunction with the world-renowned IE
Business School. As shown by the success of the partnership between
Silicon Valley and Stanford University, it is wise for Spain to look to
the University for professional expertise. Furthermore, the criteria
for the accredited investors (enumerated in Section IV) include a
foundational understanding of VC and entrepreneurial experience.
In terms of incentives, SCIF's program matches investors, but it does
not provide the entire capital for the investments. Josh Learner notes,
"[p]rograms are more successful if the entrepreneurs or venture
capitalists receiving public funds have to raise matching capital from
private sector sources as well. In this way, the market can help sort
out which players are likely to succeed and who will probably be

100. Laura Bottazzi and Marco Da Rin, Venture Capitalin Europe and the Financing
of Innovative Companies, 17 ECON. POL'Y 1, 4 (2002); accord Joshua Lerner, Venture
Capitalistsand the Decision to go Public, 35 J. OF FIN. & ECON. (1994).
101. See Gobierno de Espana, supra note 77.
102. E-mail from Cormac Leggett, supra note 80.
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ineffective."1 03 Therefore, it seems that Spain's program has
accounted for many of the pitfalls that befell ARD.
B. Spain's SCIF Compared to the U.S. Government-Funded SBICs
The second major government-funded VC program was the
SBA's investment in SBICs. The SBICs received tax benefits and could
borrow up to half of their capital from the government. 10 4 One of the
greatest criticisms of the program is its poor returns and high
instances of fraud. This was likely due to SBICs sometimes being
"run by inexperienced financiers who undertook lines of business
very different from those originally intended by Congress".105 The
SCIF's requirements for accreditation of investors (enumerated in
Section IV), as discussed in the comparison to ARD, seem to be
created to combat these concerns of inexperienced investors. By
requiring investors to have made recent prior investments and have
work experience in emerging growth companies or large
corporations, the SCIF will likely avoid the SBA's pitfall of
inexperienced financers.
A second common criticism of the SBICs is the large amount of
red tape, similar to the bureaucratic criticism of its predecessor,
ARD.106 Despite these criticisms, SBICs arguably played a catalytic
role in the creation of the Silicon Valley infrastructure that still thrives
today. 107 The red tape issue will be one that Spain needs to take great
caution with, as this is a problem that often pervades government
programs. It appears that, at this time, SCIF is not yet falling victim
to this problem, but that does not mean it will not in the future.
A third criticism is the debt repayment structure of SBICs,
requiring repayment at a time when young start-ups will likely not
have sufficient funding to re-pay the loan. l08 The repayment
structure of the SCIF requires interest payments starting immediately
upon receipt of the loan, but payment on the principle is pushed back
103. See LERNER, supra note 3, at 135-136.
104. Id. at 38.
105. Id.
106. See Bowman, supra note 62, at 1.
107. See LERNER, supra note 3, at 38-39.
108. Cable, Incubator Cities: Tomorrow's Economy, Yesterday's Start-Ups, supra note
29, at 205.
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two to four years.10 9 This repayment system does not allow investors
to push back repayment if their new venture falls short of their
projections. 110 The required repayment regardless of the company's
success, like the SBICs had, suggests that the SCIF's payback system
could fall subject to the same problems the SBICs did in this regard.
Lastly, critics point to the inflexibility and susceptibility to
interest group pressures as a major problem with the SBIC's
continued funding, suggesting that while it once played an important
role in creating a U.S. VC market, its time has come to an end.", The
flexibility issue is one that also seems to strike many government-run
programs. The difficulty presented by government sponsored VC is
it will often have guidelines that are placed on all investors and all
companies seeking funding. Meanwhile, not all industries or
entrepreneurs are the same, and therefore it seems important for
Spain's SCIF to focus on the need to consider the individuality of the
industry and investment.
Spain's SCIF's Relation to the U.S. Pillarsof VC
While every nation is unique in its structure and people, and
therefore it would be nearly impossible to use the same VC structure
in every country, it will be helpful to consider the foundation that has
led to a successful U.S. VC in comparison to Spain's pillars. In other
words, even if a VC subsidy program is well-designed, environmental
factors in the relevant economic region may thwart efforts to boost VC.
C.

1. The Spanish Legal Infrastructure
Spain's legal infrastructure allows express agreements not to
compete. The agreements must be limited in geographic scope,
duration (2 years for upper management persons and 6 months for all
others), and can only cover similar duties and occupations in a similar
professional sector.1 2 If there is no express agreement for such a

109. E-mail from Cormac Leggett, supra note 80.
110. Id.
111. See Bowman, supra note 62, at 1.
112. Stephan C. Swinkles, Top Ten Considerationsfor Non-compete Clauses in Europe
(The Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, German, France, Italy), ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE
COUNSEL 1, 2 (June 9, 2011), http://www.acc.com/legalresources/publications/
topten/Non-compete-Clauses-in-Europe.cfm.
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covenant, then Spain's unfair competition laws prevent employment
with a secondary employer while still being employed by the first
employer if the employee is doing similar tasks that cause actual or
potential harm.113 This legal structure is less conducive to start-ups
than that of California, where employees have greater mobility. 114 This
may prove to be a disadvantage in Spain's evolving VC market.
It has been noted that in Spain, the "entrepreneurial processes
have still not been standardized, and venture-capital investments
require much effort from entrepreneurs and entail high risk for
investors" .115 It is therefore important for the government to take the
necessary legal structuring steps to make the VC process more
standardized and, in turn, more attractive to investors. In 2005 the
government enacted Ley 25/2005, which lessened legal restrictions
for companies to invest in VC.116 It also had the effect of making VC
funds a separate legal entity, limiting liability as limited partnerships
do in the U.S. system." 7 Limited liability is crucial in inducing
investors to provide capital.
Under the U.S. legal system, limited partnerships also afford tax
benefits. In 2004 Spain passed new tax laws that included large tax
incentives for VC.118 Included in the tax benefits are: a 99% exemption
of qualified capital gains, withholding tax exemptions for
nonresidents holding shares in VC entities, and additional benefits
for nonresidents involved in VC. 119 The new tax laws prevent a fund
manager's mere presence in a foreign country for VC purposes from
establishing residency sufficient to result in double taxation. 120 "Such

113. Id. at 6.
114. See Hitchcock, supra note 31.
115. Del-Palacio, supra note 17, at 286.
116. Ley 25/2005 (Nov. 24, 2005), http://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A2005-19412 [for English: http://www.ascri.org/upload/legislacion/20120904_ 120659
630236798.pdf]. The 2005 law supplements the Ley 1/1999, which regulated VC in Spain.
Under the 2005 version VCs are given greater flexibility in deadlines, and the
administration necessary for incorporation and amendments of bylaws are improved.
117. Id. at Capitulo II, Articulo 32.
118. Carles Farre, Spain Provides New Tax Benefits for Venture Capital Activities, 33
TAX NoTES INT'L. 373, 373 (Jan. 26, 2004).
119. Id.
120. EU Reports on Tax Obstacles to Cross-Border Venture Capital
Investing, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (May 3, 2010), https://advance.lexis.com/GoTo
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double taxation can make investing in private markets uneconomic
for investors" and prevent their willingness to fund VC.121 This tax
law will certainly benefit Spain and place it in a more competitive
position in the VC market.
Ease of exit via an IPO in Spain is much more complicated than
in the U.S. mostly due to the lack of a strong stock market, like the
U.S.'s NASDAQ or the New York Stock Exchange. 122 Inability to
easily exit the market is not only unattractive to VC investors who
want to recoup their funds and make money, but also harms the
overall market as VC investors often re-invest from the proceeds of
their last exit. This can have a negative cyclical effect on the
sustainability of the VC industry in a country. Europe has tried to
create its own markets before, but still lacks "an electronics sector
stock market specializing in growth or high-tech enterprise securities,
similar to NASDAQ in the United States." 123 However, it has been
noted that exit through an IPO may not always be the best method,
and exit by merger (also known as a trade sale) may be more optimal
for those seeking a quicker payout. 124 By increasing the potential
forms of non-IPO exits, VCs can "bridge the liquidity gap in the VC
cycle and reduce fragmentation of the VC industry."'125 In other
words, VCs can receive their return on investments more rapidly and
then use those returns to re-invest in new start-ups. As Mendoza and
Vermeulen noted in their article, government involvement in the
creation of pre-IPO marketplaces can help provide important support
for the VC cycle. 126 This alternative exit method may be useful in
Spain, suggesting that Spain would be smart to concentrate some of
its efforts in creating a robust pre-IPO marketplace.

ContentView?requestid=65e9d49b-e38a-ldee-89cd-daf2760d51b2&crid=8b27de7b313-295c-6a66-5d9888e653b.
121. Id.
122. European Commission supra note 18, at 1.
123. Id.
124. Darian M. Ibrahim, Should Angel-backed Start-ups Decline Venture Capital, 2
MICH. J.PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 251, 252 (2013).
125. Jose Mendoza & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The "New" Venture Capital Cycle (Part
I): The Importance of Private Secondary Market Liquidity 1, 37 (Lex Research Topics in
Corporate Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 1, 2011), http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=1829835.
126. Id.
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Bankruptcy law in Spain differs from the U.S., where the
European society as a whole has "more punitive attitudes to
bankruptcy." 127 Spain traditionally does not discharge the debtor
from their debts, however, in 2012, a new law came into effect
creating "creditor arrangements" to structure loan repayment and
avoid bankruptcy for businesses. 128 However, the debt restructuring
alteration to Spain's bankruptcy laws does not provide new investors
senior status for repayment, so the program remains largely
unused. 129 U.S. bankruptcy law has been attributed to the willingness
of its citizens to take larger risks. A reform in Spanish bankruptcy
law may be necessary to promote Spanish VC.130
Finally, immigration law within Spain was changed starting
October 1, 2013. "The primary objective of this new law is to
encourage foreign investment and attract highly skilled workers in
Spain." 131 The law creates a Fast-Track process for residency for intracompany transfers, investors, highly qualified professionals and
managers, entrepreneurs and researchers. 132 The new Spanish
immigration law is very favorable to entrepreneurs and investors and
should have a positive effect on the VC market within the country.
2. Incentivizing and Evaluatingfor Greater Performance
The SCIF uses a set of qualified investor criteria to evaluate who
will be a good fit to manage the funds. Investment performance is
tracked by the company's annual accounts but is largely left to the

127. Del-Palacio, supra note 17, at 286; accord Wooldridge, supranote 40, at 7.
128. Deborah Ball, Europe Builds Own Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732329650457839861217879
6882. Spain Bankruptcy Legal Requirements, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/your
europe/ business/ start-grow/ start-ups/index-en.htm#spain en handlingbankruptcy-and-starting-afresh (last updated Dec. 2012).
129. Ball, supra note 128.
130. Isabel Escevarria Aburto, iCuant6 cesta crear una empresa en Espaha?, CINCO
DIAS (Dec. 12, 2012), http://cincodias.com/cincodias/2012/12/11/economia/
1355466509_850215.html.
131. Immigration Changes in Spain Aim to Attract Investors, Entrepreneurs,Highly
Qualified Workers, and Major Companies, PRo-LINK GLOBAL (Oct. 30, 2013),
https://pro-linkglobal.com/spain-inunigration-changes-in-spain-aim-to-attractinvestors-entrepreneurs-highly-qualified-workers-and-major-companies/.
132. Id.
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investors. 133 It is unclear from publicly available information,
however, whether the SCIF program will have the ability to shut
down a company if it is not making progress. The need to make loan
repayments will require some level of success, especially once the
principle becomes due after the initial grace period.134 U.S. systems
often rely on control and staged funding to assist with this, which the
SCIF does not do. However, Spain's SCIF does require investors to
match capital, therefore incentivizing them to succeed in order to
protect their own investments. Whether this will be enough to
incentivize is uncertain, and it will be necessary to watch how the
SCIF plays out.
3. Spain's Culture and Perspective
It has been said that "Europeans are ...much more suspicious of
business." 135 The U.S. has often been regarded as unique for its
entrepreneurial character and risk-taking citizens. "It is said that in San
Francisco, failure is worn more like a badge of honor." 136 Opposite to
this risk-accepting culture is that of Europe, where taking a more
reliable job with steady pay is regarded as admirable. 137 The European
perspective ultimately has been attributed to what "stifles those with
the potential to be great entrepreneurs." 138 In Spain in particular, the
youth "still prefer the supposed security of working at well-known
corporations even though many are now laying people off." 139
In order to invoke a change of culture, it seems likely that
something more than a government-funded program would be
necessary. How to change the views of persons and their culture is a
complex question, which may find potential resolution in the
education system. This issue, however, is one best suited for a
133.
134.
135.
136.

E-mail from Cormac Leggett, supra note 80.
Id.
Armour, supranote 41, at 7.
Andrea Francis, Why haven't European investors fully accepted the "failure is
good" mentality yet?, THE NEXT WEB (Mar. 2, 2014, 12:04 PM),
http://thenextweb.com/
entrepreneur/2014/03/02/havent-european-investorsfully-accepted-failure-good-mentality-yet/?fromcat=all#!zkfif.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Clare Kane, "Crisis is outside"; Spain's Tech Entrepreneurs Far Removed From
Budget and Job Cuts, NAT'L POST (Can.), Aug. 7, 2012, at 9.
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separate research inquiry.
4. Spain's Higher Education System
The SCIF is a program created in conjunction with the IE
Business School of Madrid. Ranked number eleven in the world in
2013 according to the Financial Times report, the University boasts an
excellent reputation among business schools. 140 This kind of
connection between a university and the VC market is the type of link
that Stanford shares with Silicon Valley. It will serve Spain's VC
market well to continue this relationship and work closely with the
university to help promote start-ups and entrepreneurship.
VI. Conclusion
In Spain's current state of financial instability and economic
recession, it is increasingly difficult to fund new ventures. 141 Spain is
presently facing the issues of high debt, low international
competitiveness, and a weakened euro. 142 In 2013, unemployment in
14 3
Spain had reached 56% for those under twenty-five years of age.
These serious issues facing the country are ones that the Spanish
government is certainly trying to combat with a long-term economic
plan. It has been recently noted that the high youth unemployment
rate "appears to be starting to force ingenuity, innovation and
creativity among young professionals who are taking risks and
144
bucking the security under the umbrella of an established business."
In an empirical study, it was found that the "Spanish venturecapital market has rapidly developed in the last 10 years and that this
development coincides with the establishment of public policies for
encouraging technology entrepreneurship".1 45 This finding suggests

140. IE Business School Rankings, FINANCIAL TIMES (accessed Feb. 1, 2014, 11:09
AM), http://rankings.ft.com/businessschoolrankings/ie-business-school.
141. Dominique Barthel, Angela Afl~rez, Jos6 Marti Mell6n & Marcos Salas de la
Hera, Venture Capital & Private Equity in Spain, ASOCIACION ESPAI, OLA DE ENTIDADES
DE CAPITAL RrESGO, 55.
142. Id. at 53.
143. Stephen Burgen, Spain Youth Unemployment Reaches Record 56.1%, THE
GUARDIAN, Aug. 30, 2013.
144. Clendenning, supra note 16.
145. Del-Palacio, supranote 17, at 283.
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that the public policies and regulations aimed at fostering
entrepreneurship, coupled with Spain's SCIF, may be a recipe for an
improved Spanish VC market. The strong link between a country's
VC and entrepreneurship and its overall economic success presents a
1 46
hopeful horizon for Spain's future overall economic prosperity.
The program requirement of experienced co-investors and its
close connection to the IE Business School are both positive aspects
that emulate some of the successful U.S. public VC efforts. The
seemingly largest concern with the SCIF program is its loan
repayment system, which does reflect some of the same repayment
methods that proved unsuccessful for the SBA's SBICs. Spain has
clearly made a commitment to improving its VC attractiveness
through more open immigration policies and business-friendly tax
incentives. These important foundations were crucial to the U.S. VC
market, and will likely serve Spain well. Whether the U.S.
entrepreneurial and risk-taking culture can be replicated, however, is
a question left unknown. The ability to measure this consideration in
precise numbers is difficult, and even more difficult to replicate.
Spain is clearly on a good path, implementing many programs
and rules that were pillars in the successful U.S. VC market creation.
While much of the U.S. VC foundation was the result of an organic
process (coupled with strategic government funded programs), the
ability to replicate this through government intervention may be
possible. Whether Madrid has the capacity to become the next Silicon
Valley is uncertain, but Spain's SCIF is a good effort at jumpstarting
the VC market in the country.

146. See

LERNER,

supra note 3, at 43.

